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Abstract
Generally a central role has been assigned to an unavoidable physical
interaction between the measuring instrument and the physical entity measured
in the change in the wave function that often occurs in measurement in quantum
mechanics. A survey of textbooks on quantum mechanics by authors such as
Dicke and Witke (1960), Eisberg and Resnick (1985), Gasiorowicz (1974),
Goswami (1992), and Liboff (1993) supports this point. Furthermore, in line
with the view of Bohr and Feynman, generally the unavoidable interaction
between a measuring instrument and the physical entity measured is considered
responsible for the uncertainty principle. A gedankenexperiment using
Feynman's double-hole interference scenario shows that physical interaction is
not necessary to effect the change in the wave function that occurs in
measurement in quantum mechanics. Instead, the general case is that knowledge
is linked to the change in the wave function, not a physical interaction between
the physical existent measured and the measuring instrument. Empirical work
on electron shelving that involves null measurements, or what Renninger
(1960) called negative observations, supports these points. Work on electron
shelving is reported by Dehmelt and his colleagues (1986), Wineland and his
colleagues (1986), and Sauter, Neuhauser, Blatt, and Toschek (1986).
Text
Generally the change in the wave function that often occurs in
measurement in quantum mechanics has been ascribed to the unavoidable
physical interaction between the measuring instrument and the physical entity
measured.  Indeed, Bohr (1935) maintained that this unavoidable interaction
was responsible for the uncertainty principle, more specifically the inability to
simultaneously measure observable quantities described by non-commuting
Hermitian operators (e.g., the position and momentum of a particle).  The
following series of gedankenexperiments in this section will show that this
interaction is not necessary to effect a change in the wave function.  The series
of gedankenexperiments indicates that knowledge plays a significant role in the
change in the wave function that often occurs in measurement (Snyder, 1996a,
1996b).
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GEDANKENEXPERIMENT 1
Feynman, Leighton, and Sands (1965) explained that the distribution of
electrons passing through a wall with two suitably arranged holes to a backstop
where the positions of the electrons are detected exhibits interference (Figure 1).
Electrons at the backstop may be detected with a Geiger counter or an electron
multiplier.  Feynman et al. explained that this interference is characteristic of
wave phenomena and that the distribution of electrons at the backstop indicates
that each of the electrons acts like a wave as it passes through the wall with two
holes.  It should be noted that when the electrons are detected in this
gedankenexperiment, they are detected as discrete entities, a characteristic of
particles, or in Feynman et al.Õs terminology, ÒlumpsÓ (p. 1-5).
In Figure 1, the absence of lines indicating possible paths for the
electrons to take from the electron source to the backstop is not an oversight.
An electron is not taking one or the other of the paths.  Instead, the wave
function associated with each electron after it passes through the holes is the
sum of two more elementary wave functions, with each of these wave functions
experiencing diffraction at one or the other of the holes.  Epstein (1945)
emphasized that when the quantum mechanical wave of some physical entity
such as an electron exhibits interference, it is interference generated only in the
wave function characterizing the individual entity.
The diffraction patterns resulting from the waves of the electrons
passing through the two holes would at different spatial points along a backstop
behind the hole exhibit constructive or destructive interference.  At some points
along the backstop, the waves from each hole sum (i.e., constructively
interfere), and at other points along the backstop, the waves from each hole
subtract (i.e., destructively interfere).  The distribution of electrons at the
backstop is given by the absolute square of the combined waves at different
locations along the backstop, similar to the characteristic of a classical wave
whose intensity at a particular location is proportional to the square of its
amplitude.  Because the electrons are detected as discrete entities, like particles,
at the backstop, it takes many electrons to determine the intensity of the
quantum wave that describes each of the electrons and that is reflected in the
distribution of the electrons against the backstop.
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GEDANKENEXPERIMENT 2
Feynman et al. further explained that if one were to implement a
procedure in which it could be determined through which hole the electron
passed, the interference pattern is destroyed and the resulting distribution of the
electrons resembles that of classical particles passing through the two holes in
an important way.  Feynman et al. relied on a strong light source behind the
wall and between the two holes that illuminates an electron as it travels through
either hole (Figure 2).  Note the significant difference between the distribution
patterns in Figures 1 and 2.
In Figure 2, the path from the electronÕs detection by the light to the
backstop is indicated, but it is important to emphasize that this path is inferred
only after the electron has reached the backstop.  A measurement of the position
of the electron with the use of the light source introduces an uncertainty in its
momentum.  Only when the electron is detected at the backstop can one infer the
path the electron traveled from the hole it went through to the backstop.  It is not
something one can know before the electron strikes the backstop.
In Feynman et al.Õs gedankenexperiment using the light source, the
distribution of electrons passing through both holes would be similar to that
found if classical particles were sent through an analogous experimental
arrangement in an important way.  Specifically, as in the case of classical
particles, this distribution of electrons at the backstop is the simple summation
of the distribution patterns for electrons passing through one or the other of the
holes.  Figure 3 shows the distribution  patterns of electrons  passing through
hole A and electrons passing through hole B in Gedankenexperiment 2.  These
distribution patterns are identical to those that would occur if only one or the
other of the holes were open at a particular time.  An inspection of Figure 3
shows that summing the distribution patterns for the electrons passing through
hole A and those passing through hole B results in the overall distribution of
electrons found in Gedankenexperiment 2.
THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
Feynman et al.Õs gedankenexperiments are themselves very interesting
in that they illustrate certain apparently incongruent characteristics of
microscopic physical existents, namely particle-like and wave-like features.
Feynman et al. discussed their gedankenexperiments in terms of HeisenbergÕs
uncertainty principle.  Feynman et al. wrote:
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He [Heisenberg] proposed as a general principle, his uncertainty
principle, which we can state in terms of our experiment as
follows: ÒIt is impossible to design an apparatus to determine
which hole the electron passes through, that will not at the same
time disturb the electrons enough to destroy the interference
pattern.Ó  If an apparatus is capable of determining which hole
the electron goes through, it cannot be so delicate that it does not
disturb the pattern in an essential way. (p. 1-9)
Note that Feynman et al. implied in their description of the uncertainty principle
that there is an unavoidable interaction between the measuring instrument (in
their gedankenexperiment, the strong light source emitting photons) and the
physical entity measured.  Feynman et al. also wrote concerning Gedanken-
experiment 2:
the jolt given to the electron when the photon is scattered by it is
such as to change the electronÕs motion enough so that if it might
have gone to where P
12
 [the electron distribution] was at a
maximum [in Gedankenexperiment 1] it will instead land where
P
12
 was at a minimum; that is why we no longer see the wavy
interference effects. (p. 1-8)
In determining through which hole an electron passes, Feynman et al.,
like most physicists, maintained that the electrons are unavoidably disturbed by
the photons from the light source and it is this disturbance by the photons that
destroys the interference pattern.  Indeed, in a survey of a number of the
textbooks of quantum mechanics, it is interesting that each author, in line with
Feynman and Bohr, allowed a central role in the change in the wave function
that occurs in a measurement to a physical interaction between the physical
existent measured and some physical measuring apparatus.  The authors of
these textbooks are Dicke and Witke (1960), Eisberg and Resnick (1974/1985),
Gasiorowicz (1974), Goswami (1992), Liboff (1993), Merzbacher
(1961/1970), and Messiah (1962/1965).
It is important to note explicitly that some causative factor is necessary
to account for the very different distributions of the electrons in Figures 1 and
2.  Feynman et al. maintained that the physical interaction between the electrons
and photons from the light source is this factor.
On the Nature
- 8 -
GEDANKENEXPERIMENT 3
Feynman et al.Õs gedankenexperiments indicate that in quantum
mechanics the act of taking a measurement in principle is linked to, and often
affects, the physical world which is being measured.  The nature of taking a
measurement in quantum mechanics can be explored further by considering a
certain variation of Feynman et al.Õs second gedankenexperiment (Epstein,
1945; Renninger, 1960).1  The results of this exploration are even more
surprising than those presented by Feynman et al. in their gedanken-
experiments.  Empirical work on electron shelving that supports the next
gedankenexperiment has been conducted by Nagourney, Sandberg, and
Dehmelt (1986), Bergquist, Hulet, Itano, and Wineland (1986), and by Sauter,
Neuhauser, Blatt, and Toschek (1986).  This work has been summarized by
Cook (1990).2
In a similar arrangement to that found in Gedankenexperiment 2, one
can determine which of the two holes an electron went through on its way to the
backstop by using a light that is placed near only one of the holes and which
illuminates only the hole it is placed by (Figure 4).  Illuminating only one of the
holes yields a distribution of the electrons similar to that which one would
expect if the light were placed between the holes, as in Feynman et al.Õs second
gedankenexperiment.  The distribution is similar to the sum of the distributions
of electrons that one would expect if only one or the other of the holes were
open at a particular time.
                                    
1 Epstein (1945) presented the essence of Gedankenexperiment 3 using the passage of photons
through an interferometer.  Renninger (1960) also discussed a gedankenexperiment in an article
entitled "Observations without Disturbing the Object" in which the essence of
Gedankenexperiment 3 is presented.
2 In electron shelving, an ion is placed into a superposition of two quantum states.  In each of
these states, an electron of the ion is in one or the other of two energy levels.  The transition
to one of the quantum states occurs very quickly and the transition to the other state occurs
very slowly.  If the ion is repeatedly placed in the superposition of states after it transitions to
one or the other of the superposed states, one finds the atomic electron in general transitions
very frequently between the superposed quantum states and the quantum state characterized by
the very quick transition.  The photons emitted in these frequently occurring transitions to the
quantum state characterized by the very quick transition are associated with resonance
fluorescence of the ion.  The absence of resonance fluorescence means that the ion has
transitioned into the quantum state that occurs infrequently.
Cook (1990) has pointed out that in the work of Dehmelt and his colleagues on electron
shelving involving the Ba+ ion, the resonance fluorescence of a single ion is of sufficient
intensity to be detectable by the dark-adapted eye alone, and the making of a negative
observation, to be discussed shortly, is thus not dependent on any measuring device external to
the observer.
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Moreover, when an observer knows that electrons have passed through
the unilluminated hole because they were not seen to pass through the
illuminated hole, the distribution of these electrons through the unilluminated
hole resembles the distribution of electrons passing through the illuminated hole
(Figure 5).  Consider also the point that if: 1) the light is turned off before
sufficient time has passed allowing the observer to conclude that an electron
could not have passed through the illuminated hole, and 2) an electron has not
been observed at the illuminated hole, the distribution of many such electrons
passing through the wall is determined by an interference pattern that is the sum
of diffraction patterns of the waves of the electrons passing through the two
holes similar to that found in Gedankenexperiment 1 (Epstein, 1945;
Renninger, 1960).
DISCUSSION OF
THE GEDANKENEXPERIMENTS
The immediate question is how are the results in Gedankenexperiment 3
possible given Feynman et al.Õs thesis that physical interaction between the light
source and electron is necessary to destroy the interference?  Where the light
illuminates only hole A, electrons passing through hole B do not interact with
photons from the light source and yet interference is destroyed in the same
manner as if the light source illuminated both holes A and B.  In addition, the
distribution of electrons passing through hole B at the backstop indicates that
there has been a change in the description of these electrons, even though no
physical interaction has occurred between these electrons and photons from the
light source.
Epstein (1945) maintained that these kinds of different effects on the
physical world in quantum mechanics that cannot be ascribed to physical causes
are associated with Òmental certaintyÓ (p. 134) on the part of an observer as to
which of the possible alternatives for a physical existent occurs.  Indeed, the
factor responsible for the change in the wave function for an electron headed for
holes A and B, and which is not illuminated at hole A, is knowledge by the
observer as to whether there is sufficient time for an electron to pass through the
ÒilluminatedÓ hole.  To borrow a term used by Renninger (1960), when the time
has elapsed in which the electron could be illuminated at hole A, and it is not
illuminated, the observer makes a ÒnegativeÓ (p. 418) observation.
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The common factor associated with the electronÕs passage through the
wall in a manner resembling that found for classical-like particles in Gedanken-
experiments 2 and 3 is the observing, thinking individualÕs knowledge as to
whether an electron passed through a particular hole.  The physical interaction
between photons from the light source and electrons passing through either hole
1 or hole 2 is not a common factor.  It should be remembered that some
causative factor is implied by the very different electron distributions in
Gedankenexperiments 1 and 2.  It is reasonable to conclude that knowledge by
the observer regarding the particular path of the electron through the wall is a
factor in the change in the distribution of the electrons in Gedankenexperiment 1
to that found for electrons in Gedankenexperiments 2 and 3.
It might be argued that in Gedankenexperiment 3 a non-human
recording instrument might record whether or not an electron passed through
the illuminated hole in the time allowed, apparently obviating the need for a
human observer.  But, as has been shown, a non-human recording instrument
is not necessary to obtain the results in Gedankenexperiment 3.  And yet even if
a non-human instrument is used, ultimately a person is involved to read the
results who could still be responsible for the obtained results.  Furthermore,
one would still have to explain the destruction of the interference affecting the
distribution of the electrons at the backstop without relying on a physical
interaction between the electrons and some other physical existent.  Without
ultimately relying on a human observer, this would be difficult to accomplish
when the non-human recording instrument presumably relies on physical
interactions for its functioning.
It should also be emphasized that the change in the wave function for an
electron passing through the unilluminated hole in Gedankenexperiment 3
provides the general case concerning what is necessary for the change in a wave
function to occur in a measurement of the physical existent with which it is
associated.  It was shown clearly in the extension of Feynman et al.Õs
gedankenexperiments that the change in the wave function of an electron or
other physical existent is not due fundamentally to a physical cause.  Instead,
the change in the wave function is linked to the knowledge attained by the
observer of the circumstances affecting the physical existent measured.
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